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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Mr. Cobell appeals from the district court's Judgment of Conviction and 
Commitment. He asserts on appeal that: the district court violated his Fifth Amendment 
rights when it allowed the prosecution to question him regarding his previous assertions 
of his right in such a way that the jury was invited to consider his prior silence as an 
inference of guilt; his right to a fair trial was violated due to prosecutorial misconduct; 
and the district court abused its discretion in sentencing him to excessive sentences. 
This Reply Brief is necessary to address the State's assertions that it was proper for the 
jury to consider Mr. Cobell's silence as evidence of guilty and that the prosecution's 
references to Mr. Cobell's previous silence was not misconduct. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated 
in Mr. Cobell's Appellant's Brief. They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but are 
incorporated herein by reference thereto. 
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ISSUES FOR REPLY 
1. Did the district court violate Mr. Cobell's Fifth Amendment rights when it 
allowed the prosecution to question him about previous assertions of his 
rights and allow the jury to infer guilt from such assertions? 
2. Did the State violate Mr. Cobell's right to a fair trial by committing 
prosecutorial misconduct? 
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ARGUMENT 
I. 
The District Court Violated Mr. Cobell's Fifth Amendment Rights When It Allowed The 
Prosecution To Question Him About Previous Assertions Of His Rights And Allowed 
The Jury To Infer Guilt From Such Assertions 
The State asserts that, "The district court was correct in determining the line of 
questioning was proper and did not, as Cobell asserts, invite the jury to consider pre-
arrest silence as evidence of guilt." (Respondent's Brief, p.16.) However, in its' 
Respondent's Brief the State misconstrues the issue on appeal. Mr. Cobell does not 
assert that it was improper for the State to question Mr. Cobell about statements made 
on the night in question, either to family or the responding officers, but that it was 
improper to use his later, post-arrest silence to infer his guilt. He further asserts that it 
was error for the district court to find that a waiver of his Fifth Amendment through 
testifying at trial also waived his previous assertion of these rights allowing his post-
arrest silence to be used against him. 
Mr. Cobell does not have a Fifth Amendment right regarding the statements he 
made to family members, nor responding officers, prior to being in custody. However, 
once Mr. Cobell was placed in custody and chose not to waive his Miranda rights 1, that 
assertion of silence could not be used against him. It is the use of this post-arrest 
silence that Mr. Cobell addresses on appeal. 
The State mistakenly relies on Anderson v. Charles, 447 U.S. 404 (1980); State 
v. Rodgers, 119 Idaho 1066, 812 P.2d 1227 (Ct. App. 1990); and State v. Wolverton, 
120 Idaho 559, 817 P.2d 1083 (Ct. App. 1991), for the position that it is not improper to 
1 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467-473 (1966). 
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cross-examine a defendant about the inconsistencies of a previous statement given 
after a knowing and voluntary waiver of the right to remain silent. Id. In each of these 
cases, the defendant had been given Miranda warnings, subsequently waived his rights, 
and spoke with officers. Anderson, 447 U.S. at 405; Rogers, 119 Idaho at 1074, 812 
P.2d at 1235; Wolverton, 120 Idaho at 563, 817 P.2d at 1087. In Anderson, the 
Supreme Court held that: 
Doyle [v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 96 S.Ct. 2240, 49 L.Ed.2d 91 (1976),] bars 
the use against a criminal defendant of silence maintained after receipt of 
governmental assurances. But Doyle does not apply to cross-examination 
that merely inquires into prior inconsistent statements. Such questioning 
makes no unfair use of silence, because a defendant who voluntarily 
speaks after receiving Miranda warnings has not been induced to remain 
silent. As to the subject matter of his statements, the defendant has not 
remained silent at all. 
Anderson, 447 U.S. at 407 (citations omitted). 
However, Mr. Cobell did not execute a waiver of his Miranda rights and, as such, 
Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 (1976), is the controlling authority in the instant case. 
Doyle held that an arrested person, who has been advised of his constitutional rights as 
described in Miranda, cannot have his post-arrest silence used against him to raise an 
inference of guilt or to impeach the defendant's testimony. Id. at 610. The Doyle Court 
went on to state that: 
The warnings mandated by that case, as a prophylactic means of 
safeguarding Fifth Amendment rights ... require that a person taken into 
custody be advised immediately that he has the right to remain silent, that 
anything he says may be used against him, and that he has a right to 
retained or appointed counsel before submitting to interrogation. Silence in 
the wake of these warnings may be nothing more than the arrestee's 
exercise of these Miranda rights. Thus, every post-arrest silence is 
insolubly ambiguous because of what the State is required to advise the 
person arrested. Moreover, while it is true that the Miranda warnings 
contain no express assurance that silence will carry no penalty, such 
assurance is implicit to any person who receives the warnings. In such 
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circumstances, it would be fundamentally unfair and a deprivation of due 
process to allow the arrested person's silence to be used to impeach an 
explanation subsequently offered at trial. 
Id. at 617-618 (citations omitted). 
The questions asked of the defendant in Doyle were similar to the questions 
asked of Mr. Cobell. /d, at 613-614. In the case at hand, the prosecution questioned 
Mr. Cobell repeatedly about his previous silence, protected by the Fifth Amendment, for 
the purpose of inferring guilt: 
Q. (Prosecutor) All right. And when law enforcement came to the 
house and they told you that they were there because Danny had 
accused you of sexually assaulting her, you didn't tell them that 
story either; did you? 
A. (Mr. Cobell) I don't understand. 
Q. You never told the police this story; have you? Yes or no? 
A. No. 
Q. And when you went down and were taken to the detective's office 
and were given the opportunity to explain your side of the story, you 
never offered up any of this; did you? 
A. No. 
Q. So the same - the story that you want this jury to believe, that 
would exonerate you if it was quote "consensual", you didn't tell 
anyone about it that night; did you? 
A. No. 
Q. So when you were being led away in handcuffs at four in the 
morning and taken to jail, you didn't think then would be a good 
time to set the record straight? That didn't occur to you? 
A. No. 
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Q. It never occurred to you to tell the police that this was all just a big 
misunderstanding, did it? 
A. My hope-
Q. It is really just a yes or nor question sir. Did it occur to you to tell 
them? 
A. f don't know. 
Mr. Carr: Judge I am going to object. The defendant has a right to 
remain silent upon questioning, upon being with the police and remaining 
silent. And counsel is badgering him about that. 
The Court: f will overrule the objection. When the defendant chooses to 
take the witness stand, he waives his right to be silent and that State can 
pursue the reason that he chose to remain silent on the night of his arrest. 
So I don't believe it is improper cross-examination and I will overrule the 
objection. 
(Tr., p.44, Ls.10-23, p.455, L.4 - p.456, L.11.) 
These questions directly implicated Mr. Cobell's right to remain silent. The 
prosecution clearly intended the questions to infer guilt. Accordingly, it was erroneous 
for the district court to overrule the objection and allow the questioning. The district 
court's action in overruling the objection was equivalent to giving an additional jury 
instruction, informing the jury that they could consider Mr. Cobell's previous assertion of 
his Fifth Amendment rights to infer guilt and requires that his case be remanded for a 
new trial. 
11. 
The State Violated Mr. Cobell's Right To A Fair Trial By Committing Prosecutorial 
Misconduct 
The State asserts that, "the state's cross-examination of Cobell did not even 
bring his Fifth Amendment rights or due process into question. The state properly cross-
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examined Cobell in an attempt to impeach him by pointing out the vast difference 
between his own version of events on the night in question and on the day he took the 
stand at trial. It follows that the state's comments on such in closing argument were 
likewise without error." (Respondent's Brief, pp.19-20.) However, the State has again 
misconstrued the issue on appeal. Mr. Cobell does not assert that it was improper for 
the State to question him about statements made on the night in question, either to 
family or the responding officers, or to make reference to such statements in closing 
arguments, but that it was improper to use his later, post-arrest silence to infer his guilt 
both during cross-examination and in closing argument. 
In a criminal case, a prosecutor may not directly or indirectly comment on a 
defendant's invocation of his constitutional right to remain silent, either at trial or before 
trial, for the purposes of inferring guilt. Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965); 
Phillips, 144 Idaho at 86, 156 P.3d at 587. 
In the case at hand, the prosecution committed misconduct by asking Mr. Cobell 
a number of questions involving his post-arrest silence and invocation of his Fifth 
Amendment rights. The impropriety of such questioning is discussed in section I of the 
Appellant's Reply Brief and is incorporated herein by reference. While the district court 
erroneously allowed the questioning, such error did not grant the prosecution carte 
blanche to commit repeated misconduct and deprive Mr. Cobell his right to a fair trial. 
The prosecutorial misconduct continued throughout closing arguments where the 
State again presented the theme that Mr. Cobell was guilty because of his post-arrest 
silence and invocation of his Fifth Amendment rights. The following excerpt from the 
improper arguments illustrates the prosecution's malevolent theme: 
7 
But for the defendant to say to you today through his attorney 
that he didn't have to explain anything to this family, that he didn't 
have to explain anything to the police, but just to simply come here 
today and give you this dilly of a story, is pretty incredible:Towant--
to comment that there is a divide in this family with an aisle down the 
middle and to express how painful that may be, when he had an 
opportunity to explain what? That he engaged in an incestual relationship 
with your daughter? And that somehow that would be okay? 
Credibility is huge in this case. But ladies and gentleman, again, 
you don't leave that at the door. Where is his shame and his humiliation 
when he takes that stand and tell you this story in this fashion? 
(Tr., p.507, L.21 - p.508, L.12 (emphasis added).) Much like the questions asked 
during trial, these statements were clearly designed to influence the jury to infer the guilt 
of Mr. Cobell from his post-arrest silence and, as a result, are undoubtedly misconduct 
which deprived Mr. Cobell of his right to a fair trial. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Cobell respectfully requests that his conviction be vacated and his case 
remanded for further proceedings. Alternatively, he requests that this Court reduce his 
sentences as it deems appropriate. 
DATED this 1ih day of August, 2009. 
~~ 
ELIZABETH ANN ALLRED 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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